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I. INTRODUCTION 
Among the many sources of strain and conflict that have arisen 
between states throughout the development of the law of the sea, 
coastal states' claims of jurisdiction over adjacent seas and sea-bed 
areas are perhaps the single most important category. Fisheries 
disputes and problems related to the delimitation of the continen-
tal shelf account for by far the largest number of incidents. One 
need only check the record starting with the early precedent of 
the Fisheries Case1 of 1951 and ending with the most recent judg-
ment in the Gulf of Maine2 case in 1984. 
An equally serious source of tension between maritime powers 
and coastal states, however, is connected to the parallel phenomenon 
of the increasingly liberal use of straight baselines and the 
widespread resort to the theory of historic titles to justify the clos-
ing of large bodies of adjacent waters and bays. To date, reactions 
to this phenomenon, and particularly to the latter practice, have 
been limited to protests or other diplomatic steps intended to pre-
vent acquiescence. By contrast, with respect to the Gulf of Sirte, 
the United States deemed it necessary-or advisable-to accom-
pany the act of protest with a show of force which took the form 
of military maneuvers in the proximity of the contested area. As 
is known, this attempt caused open armed conflict resulting in the 
downing of two Libyan planes by jet fighters of the United States 
Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.3 
*Professor of International Law, University of Siena, Italy; Visiting Professor Cor-
nell Law School. 
1. Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Judgment of Dec. 18). 
2. Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area 
(Can. v. U.S.) 1984 I.C.J. 1 (unofficial) (Judgment of Oct. 12). 
3. This article will not examine the legal issues connected to the use of force for the 
purpose of enforcing navigational rights or coastal states' claims over sea areas. For an 
analysis of these issues see Francioni, The Gulf of Sirte Incident and International Law, 5 
ITALIAN Y .B. INT'L L. 85 (1980-81); Adam, L 'incidente <kl Golfo <Ulla Si rte, 64 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO 
INTERNAZIONALE (RIV. DIR. INT.) 1025 (1981); Spinnato, Historic and Vital Bays: An Analysis of 
Libya's Claim to the Gulf of Sidra, 13 OCEAN DEV. & INT. L.J. 65 (1983). 
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In view of the dangerous potential for military escalation that 
such precedent suggests, it seems important to analyze the legal 
status of the Gulf of Sirte. At this juncture indeed several coun-
tries, foremost among them the United States, maintain an attitude 
of non-recognition of the Libyan claim. 
The legal issues to be addressed in this paper are the follow-
ing: 1) Is the closing of the Gulf of Sirte justifiable under the Geneva 
Convention of 1958,4 the Montego Bay Convention of 1982,5 as well 
as customary international law? 2) To what extent is the straight 
baseline method recognized in the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries 
Case,6 as well as in the 1958 and 1982 Conventions,7 applicable to 
the entirety of the Gulf of Sirte? 3) And, finally, is this gulf sub-
ject to a regime of appropriation by virtue of historic titles or vital 
interests that may be claimed by Libya? The following discussion 
shall also attempt to develop a criterion of transitional law intended 
to determine the limits of standing for coastal states' claims which 
are neither generally recognized nor so completely arbitrary and 
capricious as to constitute a prime facie violation of international 
law. 
II. THE ORIGIN AND JUSTIFICATION OF THE LIBYAN 
CLAIM 
The Gulf of Sirte was unilaterally proclaimed an integral part 
of Libyan territory by the Declaration of October 10, 1973.8 This 
act purported to enclose the waters of the Gulf within a straight 
line of approximately 300 miles connecting the two parts of the coast 
at the cities of Benghazi and Misurata at a latitude of 32 degrees 
and 30 minutes north.9 The United States was notified of the 
Declaration by a note from the Libyan Embassy in Washington to 
the Department of State on October 11, 1973.10 On October 19, 1973, 
4. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done Apr. 29, 
1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Sept. 10, 1964) [hereinafter 
cited as 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea]. 
5. Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 
10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1893), reprinted in 21l.L.M.1261 (1982) [hereinafter cited 
as 1982 Convention]. 
6. Fisheries Case, supra note 1. 
7. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 4; 1982 Convention, supra note 
5. 
8. Declaration of Oct. 10, 1973, reprinted in Spinnato, Historic and Vital Bays: An 
Analysis of Libya's Claim to the Gulf of Sidra, 13 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 65, 67-68 (1983). 
9. See Rousseau, Chronique des faits internationaux, 78 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (R. G. DR. INT. P.) 1177 (1974). 
10. Letter from Libya to the United States (October 11, 1973). 
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the Declaration was sent to the United Nations in a Note Verbale 
which justified the closing based on "security interests" as well as 
sovereign rights and possession exercised over the area for a long 
time. A regime of prior authorization was made mandatory for 
foreign vessels that intended to navigate in the area of the Gulf. 
The United States Government did not reply immediately. 
However, on February 11, 1974,11 a note of protest was addressed 
to Libya in which the claim over the Gulf of Sirte was declared 
"unacceptable and a violation of international law."12 The follow-
ing passage from the note illustrates the arguments made by the 
Department of State to challenge the legality of the Libyan 
proclamation: 
Under international law, as codified in the 1958 Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, the body of waters enclosed 
in this line (the straight line closing the Gulf of Sirte) cannot be 
regarded as the juridical internal or territorial waters of the 
Libyan Arab Republic. Nor does the Gulf of Sirte meet the inter-
national law standards of past, open, notorious and effective exer-
cise of authority, continuous exercise of authority, and acquiescence 
of foreign nations necessary to be regarded historically as Libyan 
internal or territorial waters. The United States Government views 
the Libyan action as an attempt to appropriate a large area of the 
high seas by unilateral action, thereby encroaching upon the long 
established principle of freedom of the seas. This action is par-
ticularly unfortunate when the international community is engaged 
in intensive efforts to obtain broad international agreement on law 
of the sea issues, including the nature and extent of coastal state 
jurisdiction. Unilateral actions of this type can only hinder the pro-
cess of achieving an accommodation of the interests of all nations 
at the Law of the Sea Conference. 
In accordance with the position stated above, the United 
States Government reserves its rights and the rights of its na-
tionals in the area of the Gulf of Sirte affected by the action of 
the Government of Libya.13 
Regarding the entire correspondence by the U.S. Department 
11. Letter from the United States to Libya (February 11, 1974). 
12. Id. 
13. A. ROVINE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 293 (1974). 
France and the United Kingdom protested while Italy presented "reservations" on the legality 
of the closing of the Gulf of Sirte in a note delivered by the Libyan charge d'affaires in Rome. 
See Statement of Mr. Bensi, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, reprinted in 2 
ITALIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 422 (1976). 
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of State, the United States' claim appears to be based on the follow-
ing legal points: 1) The status of a bay or gulf cannot be determined 
by unilateral acts of the coastal state but must conform to interna-
tional norms in order to be recognized by other states; 2) The 
delimitation of the Gulf of Sirte was not consistent with the 1958 
Geneva Convention; 3) The closing of the Gulf was not consistent 
with general international law. 
As to the first point, the United States position is, needless 
to say, entirely correct. As was stated by the International Court 
of Justice in the Fisheries Case, "[t]he delimitation of the sea areas 
has always had an international aspect; it cannot be dependent 
merely upon the will of the coastal State as expressed in its 
municipal law." 14 The Court added in this case that "[a]lthough ... 
the act of delimitation is necessarily a unilateral act, because only 
the coastal State is competent to undertake it, the validity of the 
delimitation with regard to other States depends upon international 
law."15 In light of this Libya was not free to unilaterally determine 
the sea boundary of the Gulf of Sirte, but was under an obligation 
to set the boundary in accordance with applicable rules of both 
conventional and customary international law. 
The relevant conventional rules on the closing of bays or gulfs 
are contained in the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
the Contiguous Zone.16 Article 711 of this Convention, which deals 
with bays "the coast of which belong to a single State,"18 provides 
a double test for the validity of the closing of the bay. First, the 
maximum distance between the entrance points of the bay cannot 
be greater than twenty-four miles;19 second, the body of waters to 
be enclosed as a bay must have an area as large as, or larger than, 
that of the semi-circle whose diameter is represented by the line 
joining the entrance points of the indentation.20 
The Gulf of Sirte does not meet either of these two technical 
criteria. The closing line established by the 1973 Libyan Declara-
tion is almost 300 miles,22 therefore far exceeding the twenty-four 
14. Fisheries Case, supra note 1, at 116, 132. 
15. Id. at 132. 
16. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 1. 
17. Id. art. 7. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. art. 7(4). 
20. Id. art. 7(2). 
21. Id. art. 7(4). 
22. 1973 Declaration, supra note 8. 
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mile limit laid down in Article 7(4) of the 1958 Geneva Convention.23 
Furthermore, adopting such a closing line results in the sea area 
claimed by Libya being considerably smaller than the area of the 
semi-circle having such line as its diameter, so as not to be capable 
of satisfying the requirement laid down in Article 7(2) either.24 
However, while the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and the Contiguous Zone26 is applicable to the United States, which 
ratified it on April 12, 1961, it is not binding on Libya, who has 
not ratified it.26 It is obvious, therefore, that the provisions of the 
1958 Convention are not relevant in determining the legality of 
Libya's action, unless their normative content is proved to be 
declaratory of customary international law. The view advanced by 
the United States in its note of 1974 protesting the Libyan claim, 
in so far as it made reference to "international law as codified in 
the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea,"27 seems to point in this 
direction. What, then, is the state of customary international law 
on the subject? 
State practice and pronouncements by scholars with regard 
to the problem of delimiting bays show remarkable dynamism in 
the sense of reflecting a consistent evolution of powers on behalf 
of the coastal state. From the early doctrine of inter fauces terrarum 
formulated by Grotius,28 the criteria adopted have included the 
defensibility of the opening by reference to a cannon shot,29 the 
range of vision from headland to headland,80 the six-mile and later 
the ten-mile rule,31 to finally the formalization of the twenty-four 
23. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Seas, supra note 1, art. 7(4). 
24. Id. art. 7(2). 
25. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Seas, supra note 1. 
26. See UNITED NATIONS TREATY SERIES: TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
REGISTERED OR FILED AND RECORDED WITH THE SECRETARIAT OF THE UNITED NATIONS 565 (1980). 
27. See A. RO VINE, supra note 13. 
28. This doctrine states that "a bay or gulf can only be territorial if it is not so large 
that when compared with the land surrounding it, it cannot be considered to be a part of 
it." GROTIUS, II DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS (1625). 
29. See VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS 129 (1754). For an early critique of this view, see 
FAUCHILLE. TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 372 (1925). 
30. This criterion was adopted in an early American case, Commonwealth v. Peters, 
12 Met. 387 (1847), in which it was held that the waters of a bay were territorial because 
they were "not so wide by that persons and objects on the other side can be discerned by 
the naked eye by persons on the opposite side." Id. at 392. 
31. For the six and ten mile rules see the literature cited in L.J. BouCHEZ. THE REGIME 
OF BAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 106 (1964); STROHL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BAYS 5 (1963). 
Some authors exclude the existence of a general rule concerning the maximum length of 
closing lines in bays. See GIULIANO, I DIRITTI E GLI OBBLIGHI DEGLI STATI 225 (1956); 
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mile rule of the 1958 Geneva Convention.32 
Perhaps the most serious attempt to formulate a generally 
acceptable rule on the subject was the one undertaken by the special 
Rapporteur of the International Law Commission, Fran~ois, with 
the help of a Committee of Experts which met at the Hague in April 
of 1953. The Committee was invited to clarify which technical con-
ditions were to be satisfied for an indentation or curve in the 
coastline to qualify as a bay. 
The Report of the Committee33 built its definition of a juridical 
bay around two basic criteria. The first concerned the relationship 
between the width of the mouth of the bay and the area of its 
waters. This criterion is contained in the semi-circle test. The sec-
ond criterion concerned the maximum length of the closing line 
which was set according to the criterion of the range of vision, that 
is, at ten miles. While the semi-circle rule was followed by the Com-
mission in drafting the Article on bays and eventually became part 
of Article 7 of the Geneva Convention,34 the ten-mile limit for the 
closing line enjoyed scarce support in the Commission. Thus the 
1955 draft Article came to contain a maximum closing limit of 
twenty-five miles. 
Many governments, however, commenting on the draft Articles 
considered the proposed twenty-five mile limit excessive. Among 
them were Brazil, Egypt and Israel,35 with one group of states-
Belgium, Great Britain and the United .States36-expressing a clear 
preference for the ten-mile limit. Legal opinion on the matter, 
therefore, seemed to indicate that the maximum closing line of a 
bay should have been fixed at some intermediate point between 
ten and twenty-five miles. The Commission, indeed, acknowledged 
this by redrafting Article 7 on bays and fixing the maximum length 
of the closing line at fifteen miles. This was done allegedly to find 
SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 328 (3d ed. 1956) SUY, LES GOLFES ET LES BAIES EN 
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC Ill (1957); QUADRI, DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PUBLICO 681 (5th ed. 
1968). For a precedent supporting the view of these authors, see the judgment of the Per-
manent Court of Arbitration of 1910 in the North Atlantic Fisheries Case (U.S. v. U.K.), 
Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 141 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1916), which found that no mandatory rule of 
international law existed on the matter. 
32. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 4. 
33. This report is published as an annex to Fran~ois, Addendum to the Second Report 
on the Regime of the Territorial Sea, re-printed in (1953) 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 75. 
34. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 4, art. 7. 
35. Fran~ois, Regime of the High Seas and the Territorial Sea, (1956) 2 Y.B. INT'L L. 
CoMM'N 40-41, 43, 52, 58, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4199/Add.1. 
36. Id. at 80, 91, 94. 
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a compromise between, on the one hand, the group of states which, 
because they supported the three-mile limit of the territorial sea 
had upheld the ten-mile limit in their treaty practice concerning 
bays, and on the other, the group of states that were pressing for 
an increase in the breadth of the territorial sea. The latter group 
was, as is now known, the winning side. And so the Article on bays 
prepared by the International Law Commission was finally adopted 
at the Geneva Convention with the amendment that increased the 
limit to twenty-four miles. 
Even, however, if it is possible to concede that such a twenty-
four mile limit presented in 1958 an act of "progressive develop-
ment" rather than of pure codification, in view of the relative 
strength of the ten-mile supporters, subsequent practice seems to 
show a consolidation of the twenty-four mile closing width of bays. 
First of all, it must be recognized that such strenuous supporters 
of the lower limit as the United States and Great Britain ratified 
the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea without reservations 
as to the part of Article 7 concerning bays. 37 
Secondly, official policy statements made in the post-1958 
period by countries previously following the ten-mile rule show a 
shift to the twenty-four mile rule. The Secretary of State of the 
United States, for instance, wrote to Attorney General R. Kennedy 
on January 15, 1963 that with respect to the delimitation of Bristol 
Bay in Alaska, the rule set in the Geneva Convention, although not 
yet in force, was to be "regarded in view of its adoption by a large 
majority of the States of the world the best evidence of international 
law on the subject at the present time."38 
Further, some important judicial cases brought before 
municipal courts of countries that in the past had consistently relied 
on the ten-mile rule show adherence to the twenty-four mile limit 
as a general principle of international law. This happened, for in-
stance, in some American cases involving a conflict between federal 
and state jurisdiction over bays.39 In this context, the United States 
37. See UNITED NATIONS TREATY SERIES, supra note 26, at 567. 
38. This letter is reprinted in WHITEMAN, IV DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LA w 230 (1965). 
39. See particularly, United States v. Florida, 420 U.S. 531 (1975) concerning the 
delimitation of "Florida Bay" which, according to the Special Masters Report, could not be 
regarded as a juridical bay in its entirety but only with respect to its eastern portion, that 
is "east of a closing line running southwesterly from East Cape of Cape Sable to Knight 
Key in the Florida Keys, at a distance of approximately 24 geographical Miles." The Ter-
ritorial Sea Limits, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 268 s 2 (1974). 
For other United States _precedents on bays, see United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 
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judicial authorities were obviously under no obligation to apply the 
twenty-four mile criterion qua conventional law. The fact that it 
was found decisive in the particular case is to be interpreted as 
the consequence of a corresponding determination that the twenty-
four mile limit is a rule of customary international law.4° Finally, 
the consolidation of the twenty-four mile limit into international 
practice is shown by the adoption of this rule as Article 10 of the 
1982 Montego Bay Convention,41 reproducing in its relevant part 
Article 7 of the 1958 Geneva Convention.42 
As far as customary international law is concerned, it is im-
possible to recognize the Libyan claim as consistent with the general 
regime in force regarding the technical delimitation of bays. It is 
therefore necessary to turn to an examination of other possible legal 
grounds for the validity of the Libyan claim. These are the "straight 
baselines method of delimitation" and the claim to a "historic" title 
over the Gulf of Sirte. 
III. IS THE "STRAIGHT BASELINES" METHOD 
APPLICABLE TO THE GULF OF SIRTE? 
Although the Libyan government does not appear to have made 
express reference to the straight baseline method in its 1973 Decla-
ration an examination of it is necessary in view of the unique legal 
basis that it provides for the enclosure of internal waters which do 
not technically qualify as "bays." Article 4 of the Geneva Convention43 
and the 1951 precedent of the Fisheries Case" allow the closing off 
of a body of adjacent waters independently of the twenty-four mile 
limit and the semi-circle test, provided a certain number of condi-
tions are met by the coastal state. The first condition concerns the 
geographic character of the coastline which must be "deeply in-
dented and cut into,"415 or possess "a fringe of islands along the 
coast."48 The second relates to the general direction of the coast 
from which the baseline must not depart to any appreciable extent.47 
(1964), reh'g denied, 382 U.S. 889 (1965), modified 382 U.S. 448 (1966), modified, 432 U.S. 40 
(1977); United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, reh'g denied, 394 U.S. 994, modified, 394 U.S. 
l, modified, 394 U.S. 836 (1969). 
40. United States v. Florida, 420 U.S. at 531. 
41. 1982 Convention, supra note 5. 
42. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 4. 
43. Id. 
44. Fisheries Case, supra note 1. 
45. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 4, art. 4(1). 
46. Id. 
47. Id. art. 4(2). 
8
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 11, No. 2 [1984], Art. 6
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol11/iss2/6
1984) Gulf of Sirte 319 
The third concerns the link between the body of waters to be enclos-
ed and the mainland. This link must be sufficiently close as to render 
the waters under examination capable of being treated as internal. '8 
Finally, Article 4(4), indicates as .a relevant factor the existence 
of economic interests "peculiar to the region concerned, the reality 
and the importance of which are clearly evidenced by a long usage."49 
These conditions have been confirmed, with some additions, in the 
text of Article 7 of the 1982 Montego Bay Convention on the Law 
of the Sea,50 so that it is reasonable to assume that they represent 
generally accepted standards of international law. 
Is the drawing of a straight line across the Gulf of Sirte con-
sistent with these standards? An examination of the Libyan 
coastline shows that it is neither deeply indented nor cut into around 
the Gulf of Sirte, and that there is no fringe of islands present. 
Rather, the Gulf is characterized by one large recess in the coast 
whose opening is approximately 300 miles. 
The closing line also departs from the direction of the coast. 
Indeed, it has the effect of macroscopically rounding off the pro-
file of the African coast. As for the condition concerning sufficiently 
close links of the waters landward of the baseline with the land 
domain, it could perhaps at least be conceded that the deeper por-
tion of the Gulf satisfies this condition. With respect to the economic 
interests relevant to the region concerned, although they may have 
been a factor in the decision of the Libyan government, they were 
not identified at the time of the 1973 Declaration, nor was any 
evidence of long usage given as required by Article 4(4) of the 
Geneva Convention51 and Article 7(5) of the Montego Bay 
Convention.52 
As can be seen, the conditions for the drawing of straight 
baselines are only partially met in the case of the Gulf of Sirte. Thus, 
there is ample reason for doubt about the admissibility of such 
baselines, particularly in relation to the geographic conditions of 
the Libyan coast. The use of the word "doubt" is particularly ap-
propriate because of the lack of legal precision in the above-
described criteria concerning admissibility of baselines. It is sub-
mitted that this lack of precision has led to a "liberal interpreta-
48. Id. art. 4(4). 
49. Id. Reference to economic interests as one of the relevant factors justifying the 
employment of straight baselines was first contained in the Fisheries Case, supra note 1, 
at 116, 142. 
50. 1982 Convention, supra note 5. 
51. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 4. 
52. 1982 Convention, supra note 5. 
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tion" of the same criteria with a resulting departure in state prac-
tice from those conditions which originally justified, such as in the 
case of the Norwegian coast, the employment and subsequent 
recognition of the method.53 A recent example of state practice 
which reflects the adoption of "exaggerated" baselines is the Italian 
Decree of April 26, 1977 ,54 proclaiming both the closing of all the 
major gulfs of the peninsula, despite the fact that the width of their 
entrances exceeds55 the twenty-four mile limit, and the drawing of 
straight lines around the Tuscan archipelago and the perimeter of 
the two islands of Sicily and Sardinia. 
But even if one were to overcome these doubts and concede 
that the system of straight baselines was admissible, this would 
not involve the right of the coastal state to exclude innocent 
passage. Article 5(2) of the Geneva Convention provides that "where 
the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with Arti-
cle 4 has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which 
previously had been considered as part of the territorial sea or of 
the high seas, a right of innocent passage ... shall exist in those 
waters."51 Libya would not, therefore, have been in a position to 
prohibit access and transit of foreign vessels although such pro-
hibition would, arguably, be legitimate with respect to either 
overflight or naval units engaged in any activity prejudicial to the 
peace and security of the coastal state.57 
IV. THE CLAIM TO AN "HISTORIC" TITLE 
In view of the doubts arising over the compatibility of the pre-
sent regime of international law with the drawing of a 300-mile-long 
straight baseline across the Gulf of Sirte, it is necessary to con-
sider the question of the "historic" character of the Gulf as a possible 
ground for the validity of the Libyan claim. 
Article 7(6) of the Geneva Convention provides that the general 
criteria for the delimitation of bays "shall not apply to so-called 
53. For state practice concerning liberal interpretation of the straight baselines method, 
see WHITEMAN, supra note 38, at 137; PEARCY. Geographical Aspects of the Law of the Sea, in 
ANNALS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN GEOGRAPHERS 1, 11 (1959). 
54. Decree No. 816 of Apr. 26, 1977, 305 GAZZ. UFF. ITAL. (Nov. 9, 1977). For a critical 
comment, see Adam, Un Nuovo Provvedimento in Materia di Linee di Ba.<;e Nel Mare Territo-
riale Italiano, 61 RIV. DIR. INT. 470 (1978). 
55. The Gulfs of Venice, Manfredonia, Salerno, Squillace and Taranto. 
56. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 4, art. 5(2). 
57. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 4, art. 14(4); 1982 Convention, 
supra note 5, art. 19(2). 
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'historic' bays."58 This exception is relevant to the dispute over the 
Gulf of Sirte because the 1973 Libyan Declaration118 contained, among 
other things, a reference to centuries old "sovereign rights" having 
been exercised by Libya over the Gulf. 
The problem with this exception, which has been confirmed 
in almost identical terms in Article 10(6) of the Montego Bay 
Convention, 80 is that no objective ·test is offered for determining 
when a bay can be qualified as "historic." Indeed, all that exists 
are some general international standards which have been set forth 
in the past for determining the validity of the historic title claimed 
over the bay. They are: 1) The effectiveness of the exercise of 
powers over the bay; 2) The continuity of such exercise of powers 
over a considerable period of time; and 3) The laek of objections 
on the part of other states. 81 
These standards are also reflected in some important municipal 
court decisions. Among them, the United States Supreme Court 
decisions in United States v. Alaska,• which declared Alaska's claim 
over Cook Inlet inadmissible, and United States v. Louisiana (1969)113 
are of particular interest .. However, there is no trace of an explicit 
recognition of these criteria in either the Montego Bay Convention" 
nor its preparatory works. In addition, the latter show that the prob-
lem of historic bays and historic waters, in general, has been almost 
ignored and that a proposal advanced in 1976 by Colombia in effect 
adopting the above-mentioned standards was quickly discarded. 85 
58. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 4, art. 7(6). 
59. 1973 Declaration, supra note 8. 
60. 1982 Convention, supra note 5, art. 10(6). 
61. Cf. GIDEL. III LE 0ROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE LA MER 635 (1932-1934); BoURQUIN, 
LES BAIES HISTORIQUES 43 (1952); L.J. BoUCHEZ. supra note 12, at 237; F. LAURIA. IL REGIME 
GIURIDICO DELLE BAIE E DEi GOLFI 135 (1970). 
62. United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184, rem'd, 519 F .2d 1376 (9th Cir.1975). In Alaska, 
the Supreme Court relied on the criteria for determining the historical character of a bay 
by the Office of Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State: "l. open, notorious and effective 
exercise of authority over the area by the State claiming the rights; 2. continuous exercise 
of authority; 3. acquiescence of foreign nations in the exercise of authority." Id. at 189. The 
Court held that enforcement of fishing and wildlife regulations did not constitute sufficient 
display of authority under criteria one and two. The Court also held that acquie.scence of 
foreign nations does not mean simply the absence of protest but requires evidence that foreign 
nations knew or reasonably should have known that the claim over the bay was being 
asserted. Id. at 202. 
63. Louisiana, 394 U.S. at 11. 
64. 1982 Convention, supra note 5. 
65. See v THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OFFICIAL RECORDS 
202 (1977) [hereinafter cited as V UNCLOS Ill OFFICIAL RECORDS (1977)). 
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To what extent, then, are these standards relevant for deter-
mining the status of the Gulf of _Sirte? There is little doubt that 
a strict application of these criteria to the Gulf is quite unlikely 
to produce a finding of historic title. Despite the rather naive 
reference in the Libyan Declaration86 to a centuries old display of 
sovereignty, there is really no serious evidence to confirm that such 
a display of sovereignty every existed, either during the Italian 
domination over Libya and Tripolitania or before then, during the 
Turkish Empire's domination over Libya. On the contrary, as far 
as Italy is concerned, the 1973 Declaration87 was criticized in a man-
ner which would have been completely out of place had Italy 
somehow concurred in the past with the formulation of an historic 
title over the Gulf of Sirte.• 
V. THE THEORY OF "VITAL" BAYS 
The problem, however, cannot be disposed of on the basis of 
these considerations alone. In fact, it is quite indisputable that 
within the mainstream of tendencies aimed at widening the limits 
of coastal states' jurisdiction over adjacent waters, one recent prac-
tice has emerged strongly concerning the assertion of an exceptional 
jus excludendi over large bays. That basis is one of alleged "vital'' 
interests founded on security or economic considerations arising 
independently of any true historic title. This theory, better known 
as the theory of "vital" bays, has been justified by newly indepen-
dent states in order to combat the unfavorable situation which 
would arise vis-a-vis long-established states due to the "incapacity" 
of the former to rely upon history or a long passage of time to assert 
claims over their adjacent waters. 69 
This justification, however, is not without flaws. First, new states 
can always invoke the history and practice of their predecessors to make 
territorial claims~ Second, this theory implies that new states have the 
capacity to appropriate exceptional maritime areas by instantaneous deci-
sions based on their vital interests. Such a capacity seriously prejudices 
66. See note 8. 
67. Id. 
68. For the Italian reactions, see Statement of Mr. Bensi, supra note. 13. 
69. For a discussion of this view, see Summary Records of 318th Meeting, (1955) 1 
Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N 211, U.N. Doc. A/2693, ACN.4/90 and Add.1-5; A/CN.4/93; A/CN.4/L.54 
(statement of Garcia Amador); BLUM. HISTORIC TITLES IN INTERNATIONAL LA w 179, 241 (1965). 
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those states who have acquired corresponding titles at the expense of 
long practice and passage of time. Rather, then, than resting on strictly 
legal grounds, the theory of "vital" bays seems to be "politically" 
motivated by the widespread suspicion and even intolerance that has 
been shown by many newly born states toward the traditional slow pro-
cess of custom formation. The result, from a general point of view, 
is a preference for agreements and codification. Moreover, with respect 
to the particular problem here discussed, there is a preference for 
unilateral acts soliciting the prompt recognition of other nations of the 
interests asserted. 
In any event, it seems doubtful the doctrine of "vital" bays may 
be labeled as a radical and isolated Libyan doctrine. Similar claims have 
been pressed by, among others, the Soviet Union with respect to the 
Bay of Peter the Great, Argentina and Uruguay with respect to the very 
extensive area of Rio de la Plata estuary, Panama with respect to the 
Panamanian Gulf, and Australia, Gabon and Guinea with respect to 
practically all the bays and gulfs of their coasts. 10 
As previously mentioned, the Italian government has also asserted 
exceptional claims over Italy's adjacent waters by closing the Gulf of 
Taranto with a straight line of approximately 60 miles within which the 
waters are considered internal. The Presidential Decree by which this 
assertion of authority was effected ref erred to an historic title. 71 
However, there is no serious evidence of historic titles over the area 
which conforms to the traditional standards mentioned above. On the 
contrary, the main factor behind the closing of this Gulf appears to 
be to secure the Gulf from the unwelcome visits of non-NA TO naval 
units. 
This also explains the apparent lack of protest on the part of foreign 
nations. 12 NATO countries have no interest in challenging the Italian 
action insofar as it benefits them as well. On the other hand, the Soviet 
Union is not in a position to raise any legal issue on this matter since 
70. For a survey of state claims, see Secretary General of the United Nations, Juridical 
Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays, (1962) 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 1; VII & 
VIII NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LA w OF THE SEA (M. Nordquist, s. Houston & K.R. Simmonds 
eds. 1980). 
71. Presidential Decree No. 816, supra note 54. 
72. Only the United Kingdom appears to have shown some concern about the Gulf 
of Taranto. In 1981 the Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, replied to a question raised 
by Lord Kenneth that the British interpretation of the Geneva Convention was not consis-
tent with the Italian Claim. The same reply, however, specified that NATO does not take 
a position with respect to the territorial sea limits of its members. See Ronzitti, Is the Gulf 
of Tarnnto an Historic Bay? 11 SYR. J. INT'L L. & COMM. 275 (1984). 
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it was one of the forerunners in the trend toward making sweeping claims 
over large bays, such as the Bay of Peter the Great facing Japan. 73 
VI. TOWARD A RELATIVE APPROACH ON "HISTORIC" 
BAYS 
If judged in this dynamic context, the Libyan claim over the 
Gulf of Sirte may not be qualified as a violation of international 
law. By the same token, the Libyan claim cannot be considered in 
itself as constituting an internationally valid title over the area. 
Rather, it is the first step in the process of asserting a special regime 
which may or may not be successfully established depending on a 
range of considerations including the acquiescence of other states, 
the extent of analogous claims advanced in international practice, 
and the persistence of the Libyan claim itself in the future. 
What one cannot overlook in this context is that the evolution 
of the Law of the Sea in the past three decades has been marked 
by the repeated assertion of claims based on special interests and 
circumstances of a geographic, economic, or environmental nature. 
Moreover, while strongly contested at the beginning, these claims 
have actually prevailed over the competing general interest of the 
freedom of the seas. 
Besides the most obvious example of the straight baseline 
method being sanctioned on the basis of special circumstances in 
the Fisheries Case,1' one may recall the Canadian Arctic Waters 
Pollution Prevention Act of 1970.75 That Act created a 100-mile 
exclusive zone which was at first protested by the major maritime 
powers but later acquiesced to and finally recognized in Section 
8 of the Montego Bay Convention.76 To this should be added that 
fishing zones were at first opposed, even by force, and then 
challenged before the International Court of Justice in the Fisheries 
73. This bay was claimed as national waters by a decision of the Council of Ministers 
of the Soviet Union of July 20, 1957. The United States protested on August 12, 1957, and 
again on August 20, 1958. France, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Holland, Germany and Japan 
also protested. See Rousseau, Not,es et Commentaires: Extension <Us Eaux Terri.t<rriales Soviete-
ques dans la Baie de Vladivostock, 62 R. G. DR. INT. P. 63 (1958); BUTLER, THE SOVIET UNION 
AND THE LA w OF THE SEA 108 (1971 ). The Soviet Union replied on January 7, 1958, to the United 
States protest contesting the arguments and rejecting its conclusions. See WHITEMAN, supra 
note 38, at 255. 
7 4. Fisheries Case, supra note 1. 
75. CAN. REV. STAT. ch. Al (Supp. I 1970). For comments, see PHARAND, THE LAW OF THE 
SEA OF THE ARCTIC WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO CANADA (1983). 
76. Cf. 1982 Convention, supra note 25, art. 294 concerning the admissibility of a pollu-
tion prevention zone in ice-covered areas. 
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Jurisdiction Case,11 but then were almost immediately followed by 
combined assertion in state practice and UNCLOS III with the con-
cept of a 200-mile exclusive economic zone. The international law 
of bays has been similarly influenced by this general trend. The 
number and frequency of coastal states' claims in this regard shows 
that the old concept of an historic bay is currently evolving into 
a more flexible notion whose crucial elements are the bona fide asser-
tion of state interests and the recognition of and acquiescence of 
third states, rather that immemorial usage and the long passage 
of time. 
VII. THE ROLE OF RECIPROCITY 
A "relative approach on historic bays" involves a certain degree 
of legal uncertainty in the period of time before the definitive con-
solidation of title or, vice versa, before the definitive failure of it 
by virtue of a generalized attitude of objection. This is precisely 
the period in which the Gulf of Sirte incident occurred, and it is 
precisely with respect to this period of time that it is necessary 
to ask what rules, if any, govern the rela.tions between the claim-
ing coastal state and other states. An answer to this question may 
be found in the principle of reciprocity. In other words, at least on 
an intertemporal basis, this principle would involve an obligation 
to respect the Libyan claim by those states whose own domestic 
legislation and international practice has proceeded to the asser-
tion of similarly exceptional claims over their respective coasts. Con-
versely, no such obligation would exist for those states which ab-
stain from pressing claims of a similar nature with respect to their 
own bays or gulfs. 78 
The application of this criterion to the Gulf of Sirte leads to 
the interesting result that the Libyan claim is, indeed, indirectly 
supported by the practice of other neighbouring Mediterranean 
countries. Tunisia, for instance, has asserted territorial powers over 
the Gulf of Ga bes, and Italy, as mentioned above, has closed the 
entire Gulf of Taranto. Both countries' closings were allegedly made 
on the basis of an historic title. In reality, however, since such an 
historic title does not appear to have roots in the past, the basis 
77. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of July 25). 
78. This is a specific application of Conforti's theory of reciprocity as one of the possi-
ble forms of peaceful self-defense ("forme non viol,ente, o meglio non belliche, di autotutela"). 
CONFORTI, LEZIONI DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 270 (1982). 
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is clearly national security considerations and interests which are 
similar to those invoked by Libya in her 1973 Declaration. 
As far as the United States is concerned, its 1974 challenge 
of the Libyan claim is consistent with a very restrictive attitude 
regarding the limits of the admissibility of historic bays. This at-
titude, which has been consistently expressed in executive positions 
and judicial pronouncements at the highest level, renders the Libyan 
claim unrecognized by and unenforceable against the United States, 
at least at this formative stage in which the standard of reciprocity 
is decisive. 
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